MOD 660
11-07-2012, 07:00 PM
"Halo" position found most effective for badge display
During early evolutions of our force-on-force active-shooter training, we inserted two plainclothes (PC) officers into a scenario where contact teams respond to a dynamic, high-stress, active-shooter event.
Armed with handguns, the PC role players were instructed to take a two-handed, barricade shooting position as though they were covering a threat downrange as contact teams maneuvered from their flanks or from an uprange direction. The PC officers were told to always face away from advancing contact teams, to not make any furtive movements or point their weapons in the teams' direction, to comply with any challenges or directions, and to identify themselves only when challenged.
They carried their badges on belt, around the neck, in hand near their weapon, and in hand up in the air.
It was very concerning to find that within the first 20 scenarios, due to the stress of the responders looking for unknown multiple armed adversaries, our PC role players were misidentified as suspects and fired on an estimated 95% of the time without first being challenged. Their badges were not seen.
When we changed the PC officers' positions slightly so their badges would be more visible, we found that they still were not readily identified and still were consistently fired upon by first responders.
Badges on belts were not readily identified because responders were focused on the PC officers' weapons in hand. Badges around the neck were not readily identified because responders were focused on the PCs' weapons and hands; in the role players' shooting stance, the neck badges were not visible. A badge held in the support hand next to a PC officer's weapon was not readily identified because responders focused on the PC's weapon and shooting stance. Even when we took away the PC officers' weapons, they were fired upon because responders identified their shooting-stance behavior and thought the badge being pointed was a gun.
The most effective badge position we identified was when the PC officers' held their badges high above their heads, rotating the badge around like a halo. This allowed the badge to be presented in all directions, as close to 360 degrees as possible.
Contact teams were less apt to engage these PCs because they recognized the position as less threatening, even though the PC held a gun in the other hand. This position drew the attention of contact officers and bought enough time for them to focus on the raised hand holding the badge.
The responding officer's distance, lighting conditions, and vision limitations are all contributing factors in effectively identifying a badge being held by a PC officer. But the most important factor in a PC being misidentified is his/her displayed behavior. LEOs are very good in identifying certain behaviors as consistent with armed threats.
Among the lessons we learned:
Train first responders that not everyone holding a gun is a suspect.
Establish a challenge protocol to limit the likelihood of blue-on-blue error. We were able to significantly drop the instances of role-players being shot down to 50% after stressing the importance of challenge procedures.
The longer the PC presents himself holding a gun or displaying armed behavior, the higher the likelihood of being misidentified and fired upon.
As a PC choosing to respond to an armed threat, we recommend keeping your weapon concealed as long as possible as you maneuver to a position of advantage. Only present the weapon when you absolutely, positively have to engage bad-guy threats. After engaging and conducting necessary after-action procedures, immediately holster, conceal the weapon, move to cover, and be prepared to "halo" your badge.
Open up all trainees' situational awareness to understand they are an UNKNOWN person when in plainclothes and their behaviors when holding a gun may be perceived as a threat to other first responders (uniformed as well as plainclothes and off-duty).
We are still trying different strategies and are constantly updating our curriculum in a effort to be more effective. I would appreciate any insight or recommendations others may have.
Sgt. Michael Harding
Tactics & Survival Training Unit
Los Angeles County (CA) SD
mmhardin@lasd.org
During early evolutions of our force-on-force active-shooter training, we inserted two plainclothes (PC) officers into a scenario where contact teams respond to a dynamic, high-stress, active-shooter event.
Armed with handguns, the PC role players were instructed to take a two-handed, barricade shooting position as though they were covering a threat downrange as contact teams maneuvered from their flanks or from an uprange direction. The PC officers were told to always face away from advancing contact teams, to not make any furtive movements or point their weapons in the teams' direction, to comply with any challenges or directions, and to identify themselves only when challenged.
They carried their badges on belt, around the neck, in hand near their weapon, and in hand up in the air.
It was very concerning to find that within the first 20 scenarios, due to the stress of the responders looking for unknown multiple armed adversaries, our PC role players were misidentified as suspects and fired on an estimated 95% of the time without first being challenged. Their badges were not seen.
When we changed the PC officers' positions slightly so their badges would be more visible, we found that they still were not readily identified and still were consistently fired upon by first responders.
Badges on belts were not readily identified because responders were focused on the PC officers' weapons in hand. Badges around the neck were not readily identified because responders were focused on the PCs' weapons and hands; in the role players' shooting stance, the neck badges were not visible. A badge held in the support hand next to a PC officer's weapon was not readily identified because responders focused on the PC's weapon and shooting stance. Even when we took away the PC officers' weapons, they were fired upon because responders identified their shooting-stance behavior and thought the badge being pointed was a gun.
The most effective badge position we identified was when the PC officers' held their badges high above their heads, rotating the badge around like a halo. This allowed the badge to be presented in all directions, as close to 360 degrees as possible.
Contact teams were less apt to engage these PCs because they recognized the position as less threatening, even though the PC held a gun in the other hand. This position drew the attention of contact officers and bought enough time for them to focus on the raised hand holding the badge.
The responding officer's distance, lighting conditions, and vision limitations are all contributing factors in effectively identifying a badge being held by a PC officer. But the most important factor in a PC being misidentified is his/her displayed behavior. LEOs are very good in identifying certain behaviors as consistent with armed threats.
Among the lessons we learned:
Train first responders that not everyone holding a gun is a suspect.
Establish a challenge protocol to limit the likelihood of blue-on-blue error. We were able to significantly drop the instances of role-players being shot down to 50% after stressing the importance of challenge procedures.
The longer the PC presents himself holding a gun or displaying armed behavior, the higher the likelihood of being misidentified and fired upon.
As a PC choosing to respond to an armed threat, we recommend keeping your weapon concealed as long as possible as you maneuver to a position of advantage. Only present the weapon when you absolutely, positively have to engage bad-guy threats. After engaging and conducting necessary after-action procedures, immediately holster, conceal the weapon, move to cover, and be prepared to "halo" your badge.
Open up all trainees' situational awareness to understand they are an UNKNOWN person when in plainclothes and their behaviors when holding a gun may be perceived as a threat to other first responders (uniformed as well as plainclothes and off-duty).
We are still trying different strategies and are constantly updating our curriculum in a effort to be more effective. I would appreciate any insight or recommendations others may have.
Sgt. Michael Harding
Tactics & Survival Training Unit
Los Angeles County (CA) SD
mmhardin@lasd.org