05-04-2007, 11:50 PM
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United States Supreme Court Case
Scott v. Harris (05-1631)
Police allowed to force fleeing high-speed vehicle off the road
Decided April 30, 2007
In short: Police officer's attempt to terminate a high speed vehicle chase by forcing the vehicle off the road was reasonable, and thus did not violate the fourth amendment.
Official Syllabus: Full text of decision.
View the video of the car chase.
Deputy Timothy Scott, petitioner here, terminated a high-speed pursuit of respondent’s car by applying his push bumper to the rear of the vehicle, causing it to leave the road and crash. Respondent was rendered quadriplegic. He filed suit under 42 U. S. C. §1983 alleging, inter alia, the use of excessive force resulting in an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment . The District Court denied Scott’s summary judgment motion, which was based on qualified immunity. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed on interlocutory appeal, concluding, inter alia, that Scott’s actions could constitute “deadly force” under Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U. S. 1 ; that the use of such force in this context would violate respondent’s constitutional right to be free from excessive force during a seizure; and that a reasonable jury could so find.
Held: Because the car chase respondent initiated posed a substantial and immediate risk of serious physical injury to others, Scott’s attempt to terminate the chase by forcing respondent off the road was reasonable, and Scott is entitled to summary judgment. Pp. 3–13.
(a) Qualified immunity requires resolution of a “threshold question: Taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right?” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U. S. 194 . Pp. 3–4.
(b) The record in this case includes a videotape capturing the events in question. Where, as here, the record blatantly contradicts the plaintiff’s version of events so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a summary judgment motion. Pp. 5–8.
(c) Viewing the facts in the light depicted by the videotape, it is clear that Deputy Scott did not violate the Fourth Amendment . Pp. 8–13.
(i) Garner did not establish a magical on/off switch that triggers rigid preconditions whenever an officer’s actions constitute “deadly force.” The Court there simply applied the Fourth Amendment ’s “reasonableness” test to the use of a particular type of force in a particular situation. That case has scant applicability to this one, which has vastly different facts. Whether or not Scott’s actions constituted “deadly force,” what matters is whether those actions were reasonable. Pp. 8–10.
(ii) In determining a seizure’s reasonableness, the Court balances the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of the governmental interests allegedly justifying the intrusion. United States v. Place, 462 U. S. 696 . In weighing the high likelihood of serious injury or death to respondent that Scott’s actions posed against the actual and imminent threat that respondent posed to the lives of others, the Court takes account of the number of lives at risk and the relative culpability of the parties involved. Respondent intentionally placed himself and the public in danger by unlawfully engaging in reckless, high-speed flight; those who might have been harmed had Scott not forced respondent off the road were entirely innocent. The Court concludes that it was reasonable for Scott to take the action he did. It rejects respondent’s argument that safety could have been assured if the police simply ceased their pursuit. The Court rules that a police officer’s attempt to terminate a dangerous high-speed car chase that threatens the lives of innocent bystanders does not violate the Fourth Amendment , even when it places the fleeing motorist at risk of serious injury or death. Pp. 10–13.
433 F. 3d 807, reversed.
Scalia, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Alito, JJ., joined. Ginsburg, J., and Breyer, J., filed concurring opinions. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion.
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Blog commentary. Prediction: Scott will win.
Case below: Harris v. Coweta County, 433 F.3d 807 (11th Cir 12/23/2005)
Oral argument: Transcript 02/26/2007 [The Solicitor General of the United States participates in this oral argument.]
Official docket sheet
Certiorari granted 10/27/2006
Question presented:
1. Whether a law enforcement officer's conduct is "objectively reasonable" under the Fourth Amendment when the officer make a split-second decision to terminate a high-speed pursuit by bumping the fleeing suspect's vehicle with his push bumper, because the suspect had demonstrated that he would continue to drive in a reckless and dangerous manner that put the lives of innocent persons at serious risk of death.
2. Whether, at the time of the incident, the law was "clearly established" when neither this Court nor any circuit court, including the Eleventh Circuit, had ruled the Fourth Amendment is violated when a law enforcement officer uses deadly force to protect the lives of innocent persons from the risk of dangerous and reckless vehicular flight.
Certiorari documents:
Petition for certiorari
Brief in opposition
Briefs:
Petitioner Scott
Respondent Harris
Petitioner Scott - Reply
United States
Georgia Association of Chiefs of Police, Inc.
National Association of Counties, et al.
American Civil Liberties Union et al.
Illinois, et al.
National Police Accountability Project
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers
Other sources of information:
Pre-argument analysis from SCOTUSblog
Post-argument analysis from SCOTUSblog
Details from LII Bulletin at Cornell Law School
Details from Medill School of Journalism
Counsel:
For Petitioner Scott: Philip W. Savrin; Freeman Mathis & Gary, LLP; 100 Galleria Parkway, Suite 1600; Atlanta, GA 30339-5959; (770) 818-0000.
For Respondent Harris: Craig T. Jones; Edmond & Jones, LLP; 127 Peachtree St., NE, Ste 410; Atlanta, GA 30303-1800; (404) 525-1080.
Individual Cases - Summary, briefs, issue, decision below
Blog Comments - News, commentary
Predictions - Who we think will win & why
Resources - Where to go for more
Book: Supreme Court Practice by Stern
United States Supreme Court Case
Scott v. Harris (05-1631)
Police allowed to force fleeing high-speed vehicle off the road
Decided April 30, 2007
In short: Police officer's attempt to terminate a high speed vehicle chase by forcing the vehicle off the road was reasonable, and thus did not violate the fourth amendment.
Official Syllabus: Full text of decision.
View the video of the car chase.
Deputy Timothy Scott, petitioner here, terminated a high-speed pursuit of respondent’s car by applying his push bumper to the rear of the vehicle, causing it to leave the road and crash. Respondent was rendered quadriplegic. He filed suit under 42 U. S. C. §1983 alleging, inter alia, the use of excessive force resulting in an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment . The District Court denied Scott’s summary judgment motion, which was based on qualified immunity. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed on interlocutory appeal, concluding, inter alia, that Scott’s actions could constitute “deadly force” under Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U. S. 1 ; that the use of such force in this context would violate respondent’s constitutional right to be free from excessive force during a seizure; and that a reasonable jury could so find.
Held: Because the car chase respondent initiated posed a substantial and immediate risk of serious physical injury to others, Scott’s attempt to terminate the chase by forcing respondent off the road was reasonable, and Scott is entitled to summary judgment. Pp. 3–13.
(a) Qualified immunity requires resolution of a “threshold question: Taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right?” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U. S. 194 . Pp. 3–4.
(b) The record in this case includes a videotape capturing the events in question. Where, as here, the record blatantly contradicts the plaintiff’s version of events so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a summary judgment motion. Pp. 5–8.
(c) Viewing the facts in the light depicted by the videotape, it is clear that Deputy Scott did not violate the Fourth Amendment . Pp. 8–13.
(i) Garner did not establish a magical on/off switch that triggers rigid preconditions whenever an officer’s actions constitute “deadly force.” The Court there simply applied the Fourth Amendment ’s “reasonableness” test to the use of a particular type of force in a particular situation. That case has scant applicability to this one, which has vastly different facts. Whether or not Scott’s actions constituted “deadly force,” what matters is whether those actions were reasonable. Pp. 8–10.
(ii) In determining a seizure’s reasonableness, the Court balances the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of the governmental interests allegedly justifying the intrusion. United States v. Place, 462 U. S. 696 . In weighing the high likelihood of serious injury or death to respondent that Scott’s actions posed against the actual and imminent threat that respondent posed to the lives of others, the Court takes account of the number of lives at risk and the relative culpability of the parties involved. Respondent intentionally placed himself and the public in danger by unlawfully engaging in reckless, high-speed flight; those who might have been harmed had Scott not forced respondent off the road were entirely innocent. The Court concludes that it was reasonable for Scott to take the action he did. It rejects respondent’s argument that safety could have been assured if the police simply ceased their pursuit. The Court rules that a police officer’s attempt to terminate a dangerous high-speed car chase that threatens the lives of innocent bystanders does not violate the Fourth Amendment , even when it places the fleeing motorist at risk of serious injury or death. Pp. 10–13.
433 F. 3d 807, reversed.
Scalia, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Alito, JJ., joined. Ginsburg, J., and Breyer, J., filed concurring opinions. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Blog commentary. Prediction: Scott will win.
Case below: Harris v. Coweta County, 433 F.3d 807 (11th Cir 12/23/2005)
Oral argument: Transcript 02/26/2007 [The Solicitor General of the United States participates in this oral argument.]
Official docket sheet
Certiorari granted 10/27/2006
Question presented:
1. Whether a law enforcement officer's conduct is "objectively reasonable" under the Fourth Amendment when the officer make a split-second decision to terminate a high-speed pursuit by bumping the fleeing suspect's vehicle with his push bumper, because the suspect had demonstrated that he would continue to drive in a reckless and dangerous manner that put the lives of innocent persons at serious risk of death.
2. Whether, at the time of the incident, the law was "clearly established" when neither this Court nor any circuit court, including the Eleventh Circuit, had ruled the Fourth Amendment is violated when a law enforcement officer uses deadly force to protect the lives of innocent persons from the risk of dangerous and reckless vehicular flight.
Certiorari documents:
Petition for certiorari
Brief in opposition
Briefs:
Petitioner Scott
Respondent Harris
Petitioner Scott - Reply
United States
Georgia Association of Chiefs of Police, Inc.
National Association of Counties, et al.
American Civil Liberties Union et al.
Illinois, et al.
National Police Accountability Project
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers
Other sources of information:
Pre-argument analysis from SCOTUSblog
Post-argument analysis from SCOTUSblog
Details from LII Bulletin at Cornell Law School
Details from Medill School of Journalism
Counsel:
For Petitioner Scott: Philip W. Savrin; Freeman Mathis & Gary, LLP; 100 Galleria Parkway, Suite 1600; Atlanta, GA 30339-5959; (770) 818-0000.
For Respondent Harris: Craig T. Jones; Edmond & Jones, LLP; 127 Peachtree St., NE, Ste 410; Atlanta, GA 30303-1800; (404) 525-1080.